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How monist is heterodoxy?
Rogier De Langhe*
Some heterodox economists, most notably Tony Lawson, have come under
suspicion of not being true pluralists, but ‘strategic pluralists’: their advocacy of
pluralism is thought to be merely instrumental to a hidden monist agenda. This
paper does not aim to judge the accused but rather to assess the accusations; the
focus is on clarifying the notion of pluralism itself. First a paradox is found to lie at
the core of scientific pluralism. Different responses to this paradox can be traced to
different views on pluralism found in the literature. The resulting classification
allows an analysis of the current controversy among pluralists and provides an
understanding of the different aspects of the debate.
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1. Introduction
Given the ubiquity of divergent views, it is indispensable to develop strategies to handle
them without halting or distorting knowledge production. Of course, discrimination
among views is often best dealt with by scholars from within the respective disciplines
themselves. But given its common occurrence in virtually any science, an across-the-board
story remains to be told. What are the causes of pluralism? Does it result from the nature of
the world or from the way we investigate that world? How should scientists manage
diversity? What does pluralism mean for science policy? What can a general analysis
contribute to the solution of discipline-specific problems of theory choice?
Such general questions are not limited to the philosophy of science literature. Among
others, heterodox1 economists have shown to be specifically keen on the notion of
pluralism. So much so that some of them have come under suspicion (Van Bouwel, 2004;
Sent, 2006; Giere, 2006) of what Ronald Giere has termed strategic pluralism. It refers to
a pluralism advocated as ‘primarily just a strategic move in the game of trying to dominate
a field or profession. Those in the minority proclaim the virtues of pluralism in an effort to
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legitimate their opposition to a dominant point of view. But one can be pretty sure that, if
the insurgent group were itself ever to become dominant, talk of pluralism would subside
and they would become every bit as monistic as those whom they had replaced’ (Giere,
2006, p. 40). This would mean that the aims of heterodox calls for pluralism are actually no
different from those of what Rob Garnett called paradigm warriors, i.e. those ‘committed to
the paradigmist approach, viewing heterodox economics as primarily a search for
demarcation criteria that would render heterodox economics distinct from and superior
to orthodox (mainstream) economics’ (Garnett, 2006, p. 522).
Rather than getting tangled up in the controversy, the main concern of this paper lies
with the very concept of pluralism itself. This contribution does not aim to judge the
accused, but rather to assess the accusations. As such, the focus is on clarifying the notion
of pluralism itself. First a paradox is found to lie at the core of scientific pluralism. Different
responses to this paradox are then shown to lead to different views on pluralism found in
the literature. Finally, the resulting classification allows an analysis of the current
controversy among pluralists and provides an understanding of the different aspects of
the debate.
2. The paradox of pluralism
If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second most perplexing
must be an abundance of it. The latter is what we witness in economics today. A broad
range of schools strive for scholarly attention: neoclassical, social, feminist, institutionalist,
Sraffian, Marxian, Austrian, post-Keynesian, etc. They not only differ in their answers but
also in the way they frame their questions, rendering an unbiased comparison extremely
difficult, if not impossible. This issue is clearly not economics-specific. Whether it is
quantum mechanics, international relations theory or, indeed, even forest management,
diversity is ubiquitous across the spectrum of the sciences. Even highly formalised sciences
like logic and mathematics are divided into different schools of thought, debating
fundamental issues such as the acceptability of certain kinds of inconsistencies or the
existence of numbers.
Acknowledging the existence of a puzzling theoretical diversity is only a starting point. It
leads directly to a much greater problem: the problem of how to deal with this diversity.1
There are numerous possible ways of answering this question such as monism or various
kinds of pluralism. However, to tackle this issue systematically, I start with the two limiting
alternatives: to accept all views simultaneously (syncretism) and to accept none
(scepticism). Although these views are extremes and thus rarely held, they will prove to
be useful beacons.
(i) Syncretism is an all-embracing position that comes down to accepting a conjunction of
the alternatives. As there is something to be said for each of the contenders, judgement is
suspended and all are kind-heartedly adopted as constituting the sum of our knowledge of
the subject. The problem with this position is that it runs aground on its own
inconsistencies. The answer to any question would be both yes and no, rendering
syncretism ultimately uninformative.
(ii) Perhaps a more cynical response is the one which sees the alternatives as cancelling
each other out. The sceptic stands perplexed when confronted with the multitude of views.
While the syncretist still made a decision (albeit an empty one), the sceptic refrains
1 I owe the distinction between syncretism, scepticism and relativism to Rescher (1993).
2 of 13 R. De Langhe
completely. If all inquirers were to adopt this stance, science itself would come to a full
stop. Their situation would be comparable to that of Buridan’s ass: it starved while sitting
between two equally appealing stacks of hay. Scepticism seems to be driven by a pre-
cautionary principle that leaves its advocates not only unspoiled but also in ignorance.
Both the sceptic and the syncretist have a safe but uninformative stance. The only
alternative left is to make a selection after all. Now let us presume we do this in the most
minimalist of ways, making a choice just for its own sake (e.g. by flipping a coin).
(iii) This leads to a very extreme form of relativism.1 The extreme relativist resigns
himself to the necessity of choice, but denies the existence of any ground for picking one
alternative over another. In the end the relativist is indifferent toward the alternatives; he
only chooses because he thinks he has to. His commitment is contingent because it varies
randomly, independent of good arguments for or against it. He has no tool whatsoever to
convince others of his stance, except for his all-encompassing indifference. More
importantly, he has no reason for a protracted exploration of a particular point of view,
for the perspective he holds might change with every coin flip. An arbitrary choice is thus
not sufficient, not for the scholar himself nor for his colleagues. He will need something
more; some kind of a warrant.2
This first cut already enables us to derive a few useful hints on the development of an
informative way to deal with theoretical diversity. From (i) and (ii) it was inferred that
choice cannot be dispensed with. Additionally, from (iii) it was concluded that choice will
somehow need to be warranted in order to avoid extreme relativism. A first general
conclusion, valid for monism and pluralism alike, is that some kind of a warranted choice is
needed when faced with divergent views.
For the monist this poses no problem. For the pluralist, however, this requirement leads
straight into two fundamental problems, which lie at the heart of any kind of pluralism.
The first problem is how equality is still possible in the face of making a warranted choice,
the second problem is how warranted choice is possible in the face of equality. Corollaries
of these problems give rise to two typical arguments against pluralism. If the first problem
cannot be overcome, then it can be said that pluralism is self-defeating because it cannot
claim its own truth lest it be inconsistent. If the second problem remains unsolved, the lack
of warrant makes pluralism slide into an arbitrary ‘anything goes’.
I will call this paradox between choice and equality the paradox of pluralism.3 Is this
paradox the deathblow for pluralists? Not necessarily, but in the remainder of this paper it
will be shown how different forms of pluralism are constituted by different ways to deal
with it. As such it provides an excellent starting point for a classification of different forms
of pluralism.
3. Forms of pluralism
In this section I will show how different ways of dealing with the paradox lead to different
forms of pluralism. However, let us begin by characterising the complement: monism.
Monism sees no reason for equality so the conflict with choice (and hence the paradox)
1 Indeed, relativism need not be arbitrary, but in this case it is; hence the adjective ‘extreme’. Again it must
be stressed that these extreme views are only to be used as beacons, not as typifications of the (undoubtedly
more subtle) views actually held by real scholars.
2 A warrant has so far only been defined in a negative way, namely as anything that is not arbitrary. This is
sufficient for this first cut.
3 The ‘paradox of pluralism’ is an analogous to ‘The Democratic Paradox’ which Mouffe (2000) sees at
the core of pluralism in political philosophy.
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does not appear. For the monist it is possible to attain a consensus on a coherent world
view. The monist takes a clear stance and believes all others should take that same stance.
By contrast, pluralism is defined as a normative endorsement of a plurality of views and
as such it is confronted with the paradox of pluralism. Because different forms of pluralism
all need to deal with it, and do so in different ways, the paradox provides an excellent
starting point for a classification of different forms of pluralism. The two versions of
pluralism featured in this section, consensual and antagonist, differ in their assessment of
the insurmountability of the paradox. In Section 5 antagonist pluralism will be further
refined into agonist and antagonist pluralism.
Consensual pluralism acknowledges the existence of the paradox for now, but does not
see it as insurmountable in principle. Consensualists tend to downplay the importance of
the causes of theoretical diversity as presented in Section 1. For example Philip Kitcher
spends an entire chapter of ‘Science, Truth and Democracy’ (Kitcher, 2001) to argue that the
problem of underdetermination is less crippling than is often presented. Modest forms of
the causes of diversity find their way into a much-used metaphor for this form of pluralism,
namely that of maps. For the consensual pluralist, taking different perspectives is a matter
of deciding on the basis of the question at hand, the practical purpose, which perspective
needs to be taken under which circumstances. Depending on the purpose, different maps
(subway maps, road maps, etc.) are chosen, without making an overall judgement of which
map is the better map. Each depicts part of an underlying reality. The map metaphor is
used by consensual pluralists like Ronald Giere and Philip Kitcher (e.g. Giere, 1999, ch. 4;
Giere, 2006, ch. 4; Kitcher, 2001, ch. 5). It is used to present the view that different
perspectives add to knowledge. Like maps, perspectives are chosen based on whatever
practical interest we want our perspective to serve. Each perspective is only partially true
and the different perspectives cannot be reduced to each other; however, the world they are
representing and the true parts of the perspective add up to a consistent overall view. No
one perspective can ever be totally true like no map can (there is ‘no ideal atlas’; Kitcher,
2001, p. 82), but dissent is set to vanish once the different maps are allocated to the
different uses they can be put to. Philip Kitcher is very outspoken about this:
The pluralism I propose consists of the following claims: (1) there are many different systems of
representation for scientific use in understanding nature; (2) there is no coherent ideal of
a complete account of nature; (3) the representations that conform to nature (the true
statements, the accurate maps, the models that fit parts of the world in various respects to
various degrees) are jointly consistent; (4) at any stage in the history of the sciences, it’s likely that
the representations accepted are not all consistent. (Kitcher, 2002, pp. 571–2)
Ultimately different models will turn out to be complements rather than substitutes
(however not coherent). As such, a pluralism is possible in which all worthy contenders in
the diversity with which we are faced can be included: there is consensus without exclusion.
Hence, for the consensualist the paradox of pluralism is not insurmountable. Dissent and
discussion is not useful in itself but as a means to sort out all differences. While pursuing this
ideal, the consensualist can never acquiesce in the difference; he cannot ‘agree to disagree’.1
A similar position is found in the work of Ju¨rgen Habermas. There are practical and
empirical limitations that present obstacles to the realisation of the ideal discourse, but
1 The formal proof for this was delivered in a classic paper by Aumann (1976): ‘If two people have the
same priors, and their posteriors for a given event A are common knowledge, these posteriors must be equal.
This is so even though they may base their posteriors on quite different information. In brief, people with the
same priors cannot agree to disagree.’
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deliberation in an ideal speech situation is guaranteed to have a reasonable outcome. And
John Rawls claims that a society containing different reasonable comprehensive doctrines
can still become unified and stable through an overlapping consensus in which all worthy
contenders (i.e. reasonable people) are included. In sum, consensualists grant that there are
different viewpoints, but believe the paradox of pluralism can be surmounted by putting the
differences in a well-ordered configuration: Rawls speaks of the well-ordered society (e.g.
Rawls, 1993, p. 35) and Kitcher speaks of well-ordered science (Kitcher, 2001, ch. 10).
Antagonist pluralism holds that the nature of the paradox is not merely the result of
practical limitations or limited cognitive abilities, but that it is, in principle, insurmount-
able. Whereas the consensualist tries to create a ‘big tent’1 in which all worthy alternatives
find their place and tends to minimise the causes of diversity as sketched in Section 2, the
antagonist pluralist considers these causes to be more fundamental. Most importantly, the
antagonist pluralist believes that the problem of theory choice is not exhausted by
allocating different models to different uses or different domains. For example, Helen
Longino remarks, in reply to Philip Kitcher, ‘No sense, however, can be made by Kitcher
of my suggestion that equally successful representations may be irreconcilable or non-
congruent in any non-redundant way’ (Longino, 2002, p. 575) As a consequence, it is
impossible to reach a consensus without exclusion: because worthy alternatives are not
necessarily complementary but can also be substitutes of each other a consensus
sometimes involves the exclusion of alternative worthy views. Choice requires consensus
and consensus requires exclusion, but exclusion goes against equality. Hence, the paradox
between choice and equality strikes the antagonist with full force.
Conflict between (partial) substitutes is unavoidable and in contrast to the consensu-
alist, it can be rational for the antagonist pluralist to ‘agree to disagree’. Personal views
based on different experiential backgrounds are not to be weeded out but are, to the
contrary, constitutive of scientific activity. In this vein, Nicholas Rescher argues for the
need to take a stance:
We have to see our standards in a hegemonistic light—as the uniquely right appropriately valid
ones—because exactly this is what is at issue in their being our standards of authentic truth,
value, or whatever. And of course those who would deny us this right—who say that we are not
entitled to adopt those standards of ours—do no more than insist that it is by their standards
(who else’s?) inappropriate for us to have these standards, and thus are simply pitting their
standards against ours. To insist that we should view our standards with indifference is to deny us
the prospects of having any standards at all. Commitment at this level is simply unavoidable.
(Rescher, 1993, p. 123)
To conclude this section, Table 1 rounds up the differences between consensualist and
antagonist pluralism.
4. Strategic pluralists
Later sections will develop a more detailed picture of the different forms of pluralism, but
the machinery developed so far is sufficient to address the issue of strategic pluralism.
1 Some heterodox economists have warned that a pluralism of the consensual kind will likely require too
much dilution of the different views it encompasses. Feminist scholars, for example, warn against being put in
a post-Keynesian ‘tent’: ‘Our suspicion is that accommodation in a big, or pluralist, Post Keynesian tent
might extend only to those feminist scholars who use research methods consistent with a realist form of
ontology, particularly critical realism. This might mean that research post structuralist or post modern
research consistent only with a ‘‘strong social constructivist ontology’’ will be rejected by Post Keynesian.’
(Austen and Jefferson, 2007)
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‘Strategic pluralism’ was introduced by the philosopher of science Ronald Giere. It refers
to a pluralism advocated as:
. . . primarily just a strategic move in the game of trying to dominate a field or profession. Those in
the minority proclaim the virtues of pluralism in an effort to legitimate their opposition to
a dominant point of view. But one can be pretty sure that, if the insurgent group were itself ever to
become dominant, talk of pluralism would subside and they would become every bit as monistic
as those whom they had replaced. (Giere, 2006, p. 40)
This remark was a comment on an article by Esther-Mirjam Sent in the same edited
volume (Sent, 2006). Sent herself (especially Sent, 2003) mentions the strategic character
of the claims for pluralism by heterodox economists as an addition to a passage from Davis
(1997) that appeared in the Salanti and Screpanti (1997) volume on Pluralism in Economics.
This is where the roots of the concept of ‘strategic pluralism’ can be said to lie. In regard to
the motivation of heterodox economists, Davis (1997, p. 209) claims that:
is not that their own theoretical approaches are also correct—a theoretical pluralist
view—but rather that neoclassical economics is mistaken and misguided in its most basic
assumptions, and that their own approaches remedy the deficiencies of neoclassicism—a
theoretical monist view.
So according to Davis, some heterodox scholars are claiming their approach is superior,
like a paradigm warrior, and this kind of pluralism is not in line with real pluralism, but
rather with monism. Sent contrasts this with heterodox calls for pluralism and concludes
that ‘If heterodox economists employ appeals to pluralism strategically in an effort to
achieve monism, they leave themselves vulnerable to criticism’. Some heterodox calls for
pluralism are considered to be disingenuous because their commitment to pluralism is
considered to be merely instrumental to the most anti-pluralist of goals, namely monism.
The thrust of the argument is as follows:
(i) Heterodox scholars claim to be pluralists.
(ii) Heterodox scholars are paradigm warriors because they claim to have a superior
approach.
(iii) Paradigm warriors are monists.
(iv) Heterodox claims for pluralism are strategic because they call themselves pluralists but
are in fact monists.
How sound is this argument? Arguments have been given only for premise (i) and (ii). The
critics have only shown that heterodox economists such as Tony Lawson (e.g. 1997, 2003)
are paradigm warriors but make the much stronger claim of ‘strategic pluralism’, which
means that those heterodox scholars are not only paradigm warriors but monists who use
Table 1. A summary of the differences between consensualist and antagonist pluralism
Consensual pluralism Antagonist pluralism
Impossible to ‘agree to disagree’ ‘Agree to disagree’
Consensus without exclusion No consensus without exclusion
Diversity without dissent Diversity and dissent
Different views are complements Different views can be substitutes
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pluralism instrumentally to achieve their monist aims. This only succeeds by making a tacit
third assumption, namely that paradigm warriors are monists.
But are paradigm warriors necessarily monists? This conflation is understandable from
the consensual point of view, for whom inclusivity1 of all worthy perspectives is key to their
concept of pluralism. Excluding a view goes ‘against the spirit of pluralism’ because it is like
denying the use of a subway map next to a road map. The consensualist tends to take
premise (iii) for granted. However, the consensual view is just one way of dealing with the
paradox of pluralism. A view on pluralism that still endorses a diversity of views but does
not put much emphasis on inclusivity is the view of antagonist pluralist as sketched in the
previous section.
As such, antagonist pluralism is the home of the ‘paradigm warrior’, characterised by
Rob Garnett as those ‘committed to the paradigmist approach, viewing heterodox
economics as primarily a search for demarcation criteria that would render heterodox
economics distinct from and superior to orthodox (mainstream) economics’ (Garnett,
2006, p. 522). The paradigm warrior is to be classified as an antagonist pluralist and not as
a monist. On the one hand the paradigm warrior takes a firm stance, but on the other hand
the very idea of a paradigm implies that one single paradigm will never totally capture all
knowledge. To the contrary, it is exactly the full development of its own logic that will
eventually bring it down. Kuhn believed that crises of the dominant paradigm were mainly
the result of its internal dynamic and not of rival paradigms.
At least for the scientific community as a whole, work within a well-defined and deeply ingrained
tradition seems more productive of tradition-shattering novelties than work in which no similarly
convergent standards are involved. How can this be so? I think it is because no other sort of work
nearly so well suited to isolate for continuing and concentrated attention those loci of trouble or
causes of crisis upon whose recognition the most fundamental advances in basic science depend.
. . . [N]ew theories and, to an increasing extent, novel discoveries in the mature sciences are not
born ‘de novo’. On the contrary, they emerge from old theories and within a matrix of old beliefs
about the phenomena that the world does and does not contain. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 234)
As such the paradigm warrior takes a firm stance but does not believe everyone should
take that same stance. This is the subtle but fundamental difference between the paradigm
warrior and the monist. The monist aspires to nothing less than the monopoly for his point
of view whereas the paradigm warrior does not aspire total theoretical domination. He does
behave like a monist because he believes in the need to take stance and recognises the
constitutive power of boundaries. It is a moderate form of exclusion, the kind of exclusion
that the antagonist pluralist accepts as a constitutive part of scientific practice and finds
crucial to delineate any kind of (political, scientific) identity.
It was John Davis’ categorisation of parts of heterodoxy as ‘monism’ that gave rise to
consensualist outrage and claims of disingenuity. As a result of the previous I argue that this
categorisation is misguided. They are paradigm warriors, antagonist pluralists, not
monists. To call this monism necessitates an additional leap from paradigm warrior to
monist. To know whether heterodox scholars such as Tony Lawson are genuinely pluralist
is ultimately an empirical matter and would involve knowledge of their underlying
intentions. The only way to be sure would be to wait and see if they actually seize the
monopoly when offered. But, in the meanwhile, it is to the critics to provide arguments for
1 The argument for inclusivity is indeed used in debates on pluralism in economics, e.g. Paul Davidson
emphasises the virtues of compatibility and consequently rejects critical realism because ‘The CR taxonomy
. . . makes impossible a serious ‘‘scientific’’ dialogue . . . with the majority of the economics profession.’
(Davidson, 1999, p. 129)
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this additional leap, which is only self-evident from the consensual point of view. As such I
conclude that the criticism of disingenuous pluralism is exaggerated and my explanation
for this exaggeration is the specific concept of pluralism from which this criticism is
formulated, which leaves no room for a constitutive form of exclusion.
5. Agonist and antagonist pluralism
The previous section argued that a paradigm warrior is not necessarily a monist. But not
being a monist does not automatically make one a pluralist. The argument that the
antagonist pluralism of the paradigm warrior is not pluralism is brought forth by another
voice in the debate, Jeroen Van Bouwel (2005). In order to see the subtleties of this side of
the debate, the consensualist/antagonist classification from Section 4 needs to be extended:
antagonist pluralism is refined into agonist and antagonist pluralism, yielding the tripartite
classification of pluralism developed by Chantal Mouffe (e.g. 2000, 2005) between
consensual, agonist and antagonist pluralism. This classification was applied to scientific
pluralism by Van Bouwel (2009). Having pioneered the application of Mouffe’s
classification to scientific pluralism, he is aware of the different forms of pluralism
discussed in this paper: he acknowledges that heterodox scholars such as Lawson are
paradigm warriors and not monists and thus avoids the argument used in the previous
section to counter the criticism of Davis, Sent and Giere. Instead, neither Jeroen Van
Bouwel nor Chantal Mouffe consider antagonist pluralism to be a genuine form of
pluralism.
Agonism and antagonism are similar in their differences with consensualism (see Table 1).
Agonists agree with antagonists that exclusion and boundaries are unavoidable. For
antagonist pluralism these boundaries are reified and constitute a fixed frontier between
‘us’ and ‘them’, between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. Paradigms are rather homogenous entities
of mutually supportive ontological, methodological and axiological assumptions. These
rigid boundaries make possible a division of labour but are impediments to cross-paradigm
discussion. Hence the antagonist pluralist is sceptical about the possibilities for commu-
nication. This stands in stark contrast with agonist pluralism, which conceives of the
unavoidability of conflict and boundaries in a very different way. Chantal Mouffe, an agonist
herself, considers substitutive views less homogenous and as such sees much more
possibility for communication than the antagonist pluralist. This communication between
alternative views is not one of negotiation but of contamination. In contrast to the
incommensurability entailed by antagonism, she stresses the need for a common symbolic
space where the unavoidable conflict can be ‘sublimated’ in a constructive way; opponents
are not ‘enemies’ but ‘adversaries’. In this view boundaries are, although ineradicable,
constantly changing and challenged; ‘the ‘‘them’’ is not a permanent outsider’ (Mouffe,
2000, p. 56). In Mouffe’s view, the paradox between choice and equality is a constructive
tension: it is the driving force behind a debate that will never be resolved and whose
resolution is not even desirable. In sum, whereas the antagonist pluralist reacts to the
paradox of pluralism by acquiescing in the unavoidability of reconciliation and goes his own
way, the agonist ‘sublimates’ the paradox by embarking on a perennial discussion.
Being an agonist himself, Van Bouwel’s main concern is the lack of a symbolic space in
which different views can oppose each other as ‘adversaries’ and not as ‘enemies’. Tony
Lawson does posit a divide between heterodoxy and mainstream and cements this in
ontology. Van Bouwel disapproves of this rigid compartmentalisation and doubts Lawson’s
pluralist credential because, for Van Bouwel,
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a really pluralistic approach should engage in a conversation, in spelling out compatibilities and
complementarities between the mainstream and the heterodox approaches (both sides should be
engaged). The pluralism of Lawson risks leading us to an isolated diversity, to a lack of exchange
of ideas. (Van Bouwel, 2005, p. 2)
A related worry of his is the antagonist pluralist’s emphasis on homogeneity. The
antagonist, with his reified boundaries, cannot leave his post without abandoning ship. For
the more flexible agonist view piecemeal engineering is possible. Different parts of theories
or paradigms (such as ontological, methodological and axiological assumptions) need not
be mutually supportive to the extent that they cannot operate in each other’s absence. Van
Bouwel (2005) rejects this antagonist all-or-nothing winner-takes-it-all view:
The way in which Lawson develops guidelines for explanatory praxis and his rejection of the
covering law model, give a good illustration of what form of pluralism Lawson is defending. By
presenting mainstream economics as a monolithic unity as is done by Lawson, he invites critics to
reject it en bloc.
The differences between agonist pluralism and antagonist pluralism are summed up in
Table 2. Similar to the criticisms in the previous section, whether this detracts to ones
pluralist credentials depends on the specific view on pluralism one holds. As such, it is
a discussion among forms of pluralism and not between genuine and disingenuous
pluralism. But in what sense can pluralist antagonism be called a genuine pluralism?
The antagonist sees alternative views as relatively homogenous entities, separated by
reified boundaries. Discussion between rival views is difficult because of the ‘paradox of
outside criticism’ (c.f. Rolin, 2009). Either standards for criticism are shared and outsider
criticism is not possible because there are no real outsiders or standards are not shared and
outsiders lack the standards to make their criticism heard. Lawson’s (2006) criticism on the
standard of mathematical modelling is a case in point. To reach the mainstream, he would
paradoxically need to adopt, or at least not explicitly reject, the mathematical modelling
standard himself. But refusing to do so makes him vulnerable to consensual and agonist
criticism.1 In a case where agonist channels are de facto non-existent, the only way
consensualism can be opposed is by taking an antagonist form. Although this in itself does
not legitimise antagonist pluralism, it does make its occurrence understandable. How real
this case is for economists is made clear by the following quote:
to get an article published in most of today’s top rank economic journals, you must provide
a mathematical model, even if it adds nothing to your verbal analysis. I have been at seminars
where the presenter was asked after a few minutes, ‘Where is your model?’. When he answered ‘I
have not got one as I do not need one, or cannot yet develop one, to consider my problem’ the
response was to turn off and figuratively, if not literally, to walk out. (Lipsey, 2001, p. 184)
Both agonism and antagonism acknowledge the role of power relations in science. But
how can alternative views stand in a relation of contamination if there is a serious power
imbalance? When this is the case, as heterodox scholars tend to argue is the case in
economics, small and new perspectives risk being walked over if they do not take over
a significant amount of the assumptions of the leading view. In such cases, an antagonist
strategy might be preferable because of the infant industry protection it supplies. The
thorough development of a certain stance, devising the best arguments for it and coming
1 ‘But it remains the case that these and all other widely sanctioned examples of ongoing change, diversity,
novelty, complexity, evolution and multi-dimensionality, etc., are occurring within the framework of
formalistic modelling. The insistence on mathematical–deductive modelling prevails in all cases; the essential
feature of the recent and current mainstream remains intact.’ (Lawson, 2006, p. 491)
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up with critical tests might be necessary to develop it into a fruitful discussion partner in
future agonist confrontations. Denying a perspective to this possibility would be an
unequal treatment of different perspectives. Perspectives that were developed earlier had
the time and the space to develop relatively unconstrained, while an agonist would let the
later ones develop in tandem with already existent perspectives (making them vulnerable to
unequal power relations). This bias would create a bias toward earlier developed
theoretical frameworks and is only legitimate if an argument for some sort of epistemic
value to temporal priority can be provided.
But even for older and bigger perspectives, an antagonist stance might not be condemnable
at all times. An agonist stance leads to a dilution of perspectives and ‘each of them changes the
identity of the other’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 10), which impedes on ‘the full development of their
respective logics’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 10)). Although this leads to dialogue and mutual
benefits, the integrity of the original perspective is lost. And why would the former under
any circumstance be preferred to the latter? Some of the benefits of a stance might not reveal
themselves until considerable specialised effort has been invested, just as the early stages of
technological development do not reveal what these technologies will lead to in the long run
(cf. Arthur, 1989). Moreover, a Kuhnian argument, it is exactly the absence of interaction
between different paradigms that allows it to specialise and develop to its full potential
because a framework can invest all available resources in itself. In what sense can this be
called pluralist? Pluralism was defined as a normative endorsement of a plurality of views.
The antagonist pluralist serves this cause not by being inclusive (consensualism) or
communicative (agonism), but making sure enough well-developed alternatives are present
to keep up the diversity of views that is a condition of possibility for pluralism.
The arguments provided suggest that agonism needs at least some people to work in an
antagonist fashion under certain circumstances, not surprisingly the kind of circumstances
reported by heterodox economists about their discipline. Agonism presupposes the prior
existence of sufficiently diverse and developed perspectives. When these conditions are not
met, antagonism is likely to be the ideal trailblazer for the agonist. The rigidity and
homogeneity of the antagonist view makes the antagonist sceptical about the possibilities of
discussion and thus set it apart from agonism. But this same rigidity and homogeneity
allow for much more specialisation than agonism can achieve. To overcome the paradox of
pluralism, instead of counting on agonist discussion, its comparative advantage lies with
specialisation. Hence the antagonist addresses equality by holding that no single
perspective will ever be able to deliver a complete answer (i.e. ‘no consensus without
exclusion’, hence a paradigm warrior is not necessarily a monist) but still a stance is firmly
taken, because it is exactly by taking an unambiguous stance that the benefits of
specialisation will be reaped. For the pluralist antagonist, deep down it does not matter
which stance is exactly taken. It is similar to the decision on which side of the road to drive.
Table 2. Summary of the differences between agonist and antagonist pluralism
Agonist pluralism Antagonist pluralism
Adversaries Enemies
Common symbolic space No common symbolic space
Contamination Incommensurability
Boundaries necessary but not reified Reified boundaries
Never-ending debate Forcing discipline into diversity
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On which side we drive is equal, as long as we all choose to drive on the same side. Taking
stance and being a focal point for other researchers is a solution to a problem of
coordination in scientific communities. The strategy of the antagonist pluralist is to
channel a community away from single-mindedness by providing an alternative focal point.
The exclusion of parts of the mainstream and the advocacy of a division of labour within
heterodoxy as advocated by Lawson (2006) is a nice illustration of this position. While
agonism is pluralist by engaging in perennial discussion, the antagonist forces a discipline
into diversity by using brute, focused, specialised force. In this sense, both agonist and
antagonist pluralism are embodiments of a normative endorsement of a plurality of views
and thus qualify as genuine forms of pluralism.
6. Conclusion
Are heterodox scholars such as Tony Lawson real pluralists? The above has shown that the
label ‘pluralist’ can have at least three different meanings, each with their own response to the
paradox of pluralism and a way to normatively endorse the plurality of views. Consensual
pluralism believes in the possibility of respecting equality while still reaching consensus on
choice. Agonist pluralism acknowledges the insurmountable tension between equality and
choice and believes it to be constitutive of a perennial discussion. Antagonist pluralism also
acknowledges the seriousness of the paradox, but the paradox of outside criticism makes the
antagonist sceptical about the agonist calls for dialogue. Instead, it opts to pursue a plurality
of views by forcing the community into diversity, creating alternative views where needed.
Having supplied a general framework to situate different forms of pluralism, it seems
that different critics have each formulated their allegations from within their personal view
of pluralism. Consensualists blame antagonists for not being inclusive and the agonists
blame them for not engaging in discussion. But what puts these allegations in perspective is
that all three pluralisms can be said to be no pluralism from the point of alternative forms of
pluralisms. The consensual pluralist believes that interests or domain allocations exhaust
epistemic indeterminacy. As such, once interests/domains are set, there is no more room
for pluralism and one could ask if this is not covert monism. The consensualist can, in turn,
reproach the agonist and the antagonist that they are not inclusive enough. This
disagreement turns on the belief in the possibility of consensus without exclusion. The
agonist, for his part, can be said to not fully endorse different perspectives, because it does
not respect the integrity of the different views. But also antagonist pluralism can be said to
be no pluralism. It is not inclusive and it does not leave much room for discussion and
‘contamination’. While consensualists and agonists will, as individual scientists, have
a pluralist attitude, the antagonist believes in specialisation1 and acquiesces in a pluralism
at the level of the group or the discipline.
The main differences between the different forms of pluralism are indicated in Table 3.
Interestingly, the different forms of pluralism offer different strategies for heterodox
1 Antagonism is similar to consensualism in that it allows for common frameworks and hence enables
profound specialisation. But whereas for the consensualist this specialisation is merely an unintended
consequence of the assumed complementarity of different views, it is a strong motivational factor for the
antagonist. The antagonist holds that no perspective will ever be able to deliver a complete answer; it stands
together with agonism on the idea of ‘no consensus without exclusion’. But still a stance is firmly taken, albeit
just for the sake of it, in order to reap the benefits of specialisation. In the same way as it does not matter on
which side of the road we all drive, as long as we all drive on the same side. Taking stance and being a focal
point for other researchers is a solution to a problem of coordination in scientific communities. It should thus
come as no surprise that Lawson (2006) advocates a division of labour within heterodoxy.
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scholars on how to deal with the mainstream. In recent years numerous scholars have put
forth such strategies. The classification of pluralism presented in this paper could be, in
principle, used to classify these proposals and associate them with the form of pluralism
they are formulated from. The consensualist would seek a well-ordered economics by
attempting to organise a division of labour between mainstream and heterodoxy. By
agreeing on the interests or domains different research programmes aim to cover, it is
believed that disputes will eventually be resolved. The agonist calls for heterodox scholars
to never cease discussion and keep ‘agonist channels’ open. It is not the final resolution that
counts, but the debate itself that is seen as a constitutive force for scientific development.
An antagonist strategy creates a different perspective to force the discipline into a diversity
of views.
So is Tony Lawson a pluralist? It now becomes obvious why the focus of this paper had to
be on assessing the accusations and not on judging the accused. The judgement itself is
quite uncontroversial: Lawson’s relation with the mainstream, more specifically its a priori
insistence of mathematical modelling, is one of antagonism (although within heterodoxy
he is a consensualist pluralist; cf. the division of labour within heterodoxy envisioned by
Lawson, 2006). However, this judgement only acquires meaning after answering the much
more important question of whether or not antagonist pluralism is a genuine form of
pluralism. The present paper has argued that there are circumstances under which
antagonist pluralism is a legitimate form of pluralism and that it is indeed a tenable position
given the situation heterodox economists allegedly find themselves in.
Finally, I hope to have made a contribution to a more refined understanding of pluralism
that might inform future contributions on the topic. For that matter, Rob Garnett is still
right when he noted that ‘Pluralism remains an undertheorized topic in economics . . .
(Garnett, 2006, p. 527)
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